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The debate on both the impacts of cyber attacks and how to response to attacks 
is active but precedents are only a few. Strategies and political speeches are al-
ways (at least partially) declaratory and vague by nature, and beyond these dec-
larations the practical reality of cyber security as a matter of national security 
issue is challenging. At the same time cyber issues have catapulted into the high-
est of the high politics, cyberpolitics, and the line of digital and physical is blur-
ring in many ways. Also defensive, intelligence or offensive cyber capabilities 
are difficult to assess, because governments are holding their abilities very se-
cret, and cyber capabilities cannot be calculated in the same way as tanks or 
fighter planes. Primary intention of this paper is to encourage the national pol-
icies concerning on the issue of how cyber attacks should be treated and lead to 
policies for response. The paper determinates five variables which policymakers 
need to consider when evaluating appropriate response to a state-sponsored 
cyber attack. As offensive cyber activity becomes more prevalent, policymakers 
will be challenged to develop proportionate responses to disruptive or destruc-
tive attacks. Already, there has been significant pressure to “do something” in 
light of the allegedly state-sponsored attacks. Past experience suggests that most 
policy responses have been made ad hoc.  But proportionate response is a com-
plicated political question and also situational dependent. This paper analyses 
in a comprehensive way how cyber attacks will be treated especially as a political 
question, and this paper represents a rough example of the framework that pol-
icymakers should build on. Combining incident impact and policy options it 
outlines the different levers of cyberpolitics that can be applied in response to 
escalating levels of cyber incident. The cyber response framework of the state is 
also an integral part of state´s cyber deterrence. 
 
Espoo, 17 March 2016  
Jarno Limnéll 
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1. Cyberpolitics in today´s world 
Cybersecurity has become a focal point for conflicting domestic and interna-
tional interests, and increasingly for the projection of state power. When we are 
living the dawn of the cyber era it is necessary to realize what is often forgotten 
or neglected is the increasing importance of cyberspace as a political domain. 
When evaluating the cyberspace from the nation-state´s point of view, today´s 
topical questions are very political, and primarily cyber domain should be 
treated as a political domain. And when politics is involved, the questions of 
power are always present. For example referring to war, the cyber instrument 
is, like land, sea and air power, a means to achieve a political aim. The strategic 
use of cyberspace to pursue political goals and seek geostrategic advantage is 
rapidly increasing in today´s world. 
 
Until recently, cyber domain was considered largely a matter of low politics, 
background conditions and processes. Lately events connected to cyberspace 
like Sony Hack, Duqu 2.0, economic cyber espionage accusations between 
China and the United States and the role of cyber in Ukraine war have cata-
pulted cybersecurity into the highest of the high politics, Cyberpolitics1. With 
the creation of cyberspace, a new arena for the conduct of politics is taking 
shape, and we may well be witnessing a new form of politics. The process of 
“cyberization2” which refers to the ongoing penetration of all political fields by 
different mediums of cyber domain, there is also a significant lack of discussion 
and debate with scholars and experts how politically cyber-attacks should be 
treated. The ubiquity, fluidity, and anonymity of cyberspace have already chal-
lenged such concepts as leverage and influence, national security and diplo-
macy, and borders and boundaries in the traditionally state-centric arena of in-
ternational relations. It is vital to understand cyber less as a technological issue, 
but as a strategic challenge. 
 
The concept of cyberpolitics is useful. The term refers to the conjunction of 
two processes: those pertaining to politics surrounding the determination of 
who gets what, when and how, and those enabled by the uses of cyberspace, a 
new arena of digital interactions. All politics, in the cyber and physical arenas, 
involves conflict, negotiation and bargaining over the mechanisms, institutional 
or otherwise, to resolve in authoritative ways the contentions over the nature of 
                                                          
1 Choucri, “Cyberpolitics in International Relations”, 267–271. 
2 Kremer and Müller, Cyberspace and International Relations, xi. 
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particular sets of core values. Cyberpolitics is being created in both national and 
international levels, but both the cyberpolitics and cyber domain has created 
new conditions which have does not have clear precedents even if cyber issues 
are the core issues in nation-states’ foreign and  security policy. In coming years 
we will see through actual cases what the content of cyberpolitics will really be 
like. 
 
The recent development illustrates the extent to which the cyber domain has 
gradually and inexorably become central to most facets of human existence. At 
the same time the concepts of attack, defence, deterrence, international cooper-
ation and espionage take on new meanings. We do not yet have a clear under-
standing on these changes in political decision-making arenas. There are many 
power-related strategic questions on the table, but still too few answers and too 
little real political desire to find the answers. The following five topical and in-
tertwined cyber power related trends are vital to keep in mind while creating 
political framework to response state-sponsored cyber attacks: 
 
? The general trend of digitalization and the emphasis on the importance of 
the cyber domain have made states more aggressive. Because various op-
erations in the cyber domain are felt to be ”softer” use of power than use 
of physical force, states’ threshold for using cyber capabilities is rather low. 
? There is ongoing cyber arms race in the world. More than 100 of the 
world’s militaries have some sort of organization in place for cyberwarfare 
and over 40 countries worldwide have published their National Cyber 
Strategy.3 The world is moving toward a greater strategic use of cyber ca-
pabilities to persuade adversaries to change their behavior. 
? The difference between peace and war has become considerably more 
opaque. Future conflicts are probably more vague, lacking a clear begin-
ning or end, and in between things “just happen.” In cyber domain, the 
distinction between combatants and civilians or legal and illegal activities 
are harder to draw. 
? International cooperation in cyber matters is still regrettably weak. Politi-
cal collaboration is an absolute prerequisite for developing security, but 
rather than strengthening it states have turned inward. At the moment, a 
pretty strong distrust exists between states. Power and capabilities remain 
unevenly distributed within the cyber domain, although a growing number 
of states are enhancing their influence through the acquisition of cyber ca-
pabilities. 
? Nation-states are already testing the boundaries of the cyber battlefield 
and cyber domain has forced them to rethink their security and military 
concepts. The need for establishing boundaries via cyberpolitics is critical. 
 
All these five issues emphasize the importance of creating a political frame-
work: How to confront and response a cyber attack which consists of deliberate 
hostile action taken in cyberspace for a political or national security purpose. An 
                                                          
3 Singer and Cole, “The Reality of Cyberwar.” 
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equally important question is how to include the breadth of national cyber se-
curity issues and functions in times of both peace and war, and across the dif-
ferent both cyber and physical components of national power,4 e.g. to exert 
cyber power. The “cyber playbook” is pretty empty and at the same time the 
world is moving towards greater strategic use of cyber-weapons to persuade ad-
versaries to change their behavior, and cyber will be an element of all crises and 
wars we’re seeing and going to see in the future. Both international and national 
discussion about cyberattacks and how to respond to them is overdue even if the 
strategic importance of digital domain is widely acknowledged.  
 
                                                          
4 Hathaway and Klimburg, “Preliminary Considerations,” 27-29. 
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2. Cyberattacks, what are they? 
It is challenging is to understand how digital domain is blurring our dichoto-
mies – how we as humans are tend to organize the world. If there’s no war, peace 
prevails. If you don’t need to worry about insecurity, you feel safe. If you didn’t 
initially attack, you’re acting in self-defense, and “you’re either with us or 
against us.” Cyberspace—and cyberwarfare taking place in it—blurs many of the 
conventional borders used for making such distinctions and understanding war 
as solely physical consequences is an unnecessarily limited view. At the moment 
there are no clear understand what cyberwarfare or even different cyber activi-
ties include and what not, and that is the reason why so many cyber incidents 
are labelled as cyberwar. This makes the creation of cyberpolitics even more 
challenging. 
 
We need first to understand what an attack is – espionage, kinetic equivalent, 
informational – since that affects to the considerations of proper response. The 
Tallinn Manual's Rule 30 offers the definition of “cyber attack” as “a cyber op-
eration, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause in-
jury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects”.5 But, as men-
tioned also in Tallinn Manual, cyber attacks seldom involve the release of direct 
physical force against the targeted cyber system; yet, they can result in great 
harm to individuals or objects.6 In this paper cyber attack, as a concept, is un-
derstood very widely in national and political context: A cyber attack consists 
of any deliberate hostile action taken in cyberspace for a political or national 
security purpose. 
 
Experts have speculated about the potential consequences of different kind of 
cyber attacks. Scenarios range from DDoS-attacks to a virus that scrambles fi-
nancial records or incapacitates the stock market and to a false message that 
causes a nuclear reactor to shut off or a dam to open.  When analyzing the im-
pacts of cyber attacks from cyberpolitics point of view, it is vital to understand 
the blurred relationship between the cyber domain and the physical world. We 
can classify roughly four fields of activities of the cyber and the physical worlds: 
Physical-physical, physical-cyber, cyber-cyber and cyber-physical.7  The placing 
                                                          
5 Schmitt, Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, 106-110. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Lehto, Neittaanmäki, Cyber Security: Analytics, Technology and Automation, Springer, 34-35. 
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an activity to one of the fields of the fourfold table depends on the world where 
the activity is executed and occurs. The fourfold table supports especially the 
modelling of activities of the overlapping parts of the cyber and the physical 
worlds and helps top understand how cyber and physical world activities are 
interconnected which is important when considering reasonable response. The 
fourfold table can also be used for assuring that both the cyber and the physical 
world aspects are concerned. This is important since often cyber is thought only 
as incidents occurring in digital domain without physical impacts. Recently the 
interest in the kinetic cyber has increased. Kinetic cyber refers to a class of cyber 
attacks that can cause direct or indirect physical damage, injury or death solely 
though the exploitation of vulnerable information systems and processes. But 
most cyber attacks will not produce destructive effects similar to kinetic weap-
ons, but will instead seek to disrupt data and services, create confusion, damage 
networks and computers, including software and computers embedded in 
weapons   systems. It must be a requirement that the seriousness of the effects 
occurring in cyber, caused either via cyber or physical, is understood in response 
analysis. The latest study reveals that majority of IT professionals in rate a seri-
ous cyberattack affecting critical services and causing loss of life as highly likely 
within the next three years.8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Aspen Institute and Intel Security, Critical Infrastructure Readiness report, Holding the Line 
Against Cyberthreats. 
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3. Five variables 
 
At the moment governments are unprepared to properly respond state-spon-
sored cyber attacks. When the strategic importance of cyber domain increases 
and offensive cyber activity becomes more prevalent, policymakers are chal-
lenged to develop cyberpolitics for proportionate responses to disruptive or de-
structive attacks. There are not clear and established “playbooks” how to re-
sponse a cyber attack especially if the attacker is most likely considered as a 
state. Policy makers are still wrestling with the complicated questions of how 
best to respond to cyber attacks. But finding a timely, proportionate, legal, and 
discriminatory response is complicated by the difficulty in assessing the damage 
to national interests and the frequent use of proxies. Finding a timely, propor-
tionate, legal, and discriminatory response – and let others to know it – is es-
sential in the context of cyber power. When the strategic importance of cyber 
domain increases and offensive cyber activity becomes more prevalent, policy-
makers are challenged to develop cyberpolitics for proportionate responses to 
disruptive or destructive attacks. 
 
When does a cyber attack (or threat of cyber attack) give rise to a right of self-
defense, including armed self -defense, and when should it? In determining the 
appropriate response to a state-sponsored cyber attack, policy makers need to 
consider (at least) the following five variables9. 
 
First, attributing cyber attacks to their sponsor remains a significant chal-
lenge. The attribution problem has technical and human components, and both 
are challenging. Attribution problem will only become more critical as we move 
into a new era of cyber conflict with even more attacks ignored, encouraged, 
supported, or conducted by national governments.10 Attacking or going after 
malcontents are not simple and it's difficult to discern the difference between a 
military, nation-state, or non-state attack. Cyberspace allows for a great deal of 
anonymity and attacks can be routed through servers all over the globe to mask 
its origin. In politics, under pressure, responses are likely to be made quickly 
with incomplete evidence and attract a high degree of public skepticism. This 
creates risks for policymakers. Misattributing a cyber incident could cause a re-
sponse to be directed at the wrong target. When considering proportionate re-
                                                          
9 Compare Feakin, “How to Respond to a State-Sponsored Cyber Attack.” 
10 Healey, Beyond Attribution: Seeking National Responsibility for Cyber Attacks. 
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sponse policymakers should understand the level of confidence they have in at-
tributing the attack. The degree of attributional certainty will have a direct im-
pact on the action taken. One key issue is also information sharing partner na-
tions, which is important to identify where an attack came from, what it affected 
and what might be next. The ability to attribute an attack to a specific source is 
important for maintaining credibility and ensuring legitimacy at home and 
abroad. 
 
Second, in cyberpolitics policymakers should assess the cyber attack´s effects. 
The challenge with calculating proportionality in the cyber context resides in the 
speed and covert nature of cyber attacks: it is difficult to readily establish their 
magnitude and consequences. Required information can also be hard to get, 
since for example financial institutions and companies might be reluctant to 
provide information on the damage suffered because of business confidential-
ity.11 Assessing the whole damage caused by a cyber attack is difficult. It can take 
weeks, if not months, for computer forensic experts to accurately and conclu-
sively ascertain the extent of the damage done to an organization’s computer 
networks. For example, it took roughly two weeks for Saudi authorities to un-
derstand the extent of the damage of the Shamoon incident, which erased data 
on thirty thousand of Saudi Aramco’s computers.12 In many cases states and 
companies find out that they have been hacked months (or even years) after it 
happened. 
 
Third, policymakers must take into the consideration the current national se-
curity and cyber security strategies which (usually) declare the general policy 
guidelines of the state concerning on the political willingness to leverage cyber 
power. If a state is part of international alliances and organizations, their policy 
guidelines must also be taken in to consideration when thinking proportionate 
response. Otherwise a state can be accused for not following the agreed and 
shared policy. 
 
Fourth, it is also a question of the options which a state is able to use. It is said 
that every nation-state can respond using at least four instruments: Diplomatic, 
informational, military and economic.13 Responses need not to be limited to cy-
berspace, since nothing bars a state from using other channels, though each car-
ries its own risks. The key issue is to consider which cyber or physical (or other) 
counter measures can be used (as part of nation-state´s “response arsenal”) and 
which measures should be used in each case. This is a question of the levers of 
national power at a state’s disposal and willingness to use them. 
 
Fifth, there’s also a possibility that when a cyber attack occurs, the nation-
state may overreact. Several cyber experts have estimated that the overreaction 
                                                          
11 Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law. 
12 Bronk and Tikk-Ringas, The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco. 
13 E.g. Thomas, Creating Cyber Strategists: Escaping the “DIME” Mnemonic. 
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is very real.14 Cybersecurity professionals can also have an incentive to trumpet 
the threat of cyber attack that at times may heighten the risk of overreaction. 
Even if there is probably a great political pressure after occurred cyber attack, 
political prudence is needed. At least in certain level restraint should be encour-
aged, and the importance of it is needed. Self-restraint is a concept that is rele-
vant to keep in mind to de-escalation of the activities, especially if kinetic re-
sponse is considered. In general, deterring escalation requires that the adver-
sary believe that escalation will result in a worse outcome than restraint, which 
can be occasionally a stronger way to manifest national cyber power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 E.g. McGraw and Fick, Separating threat from the hype: What Washington needs to know 
about cyber security. 
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4. OPM hack case – an example 
A good example of the need to answer all five variables is the cyber attacks 
against the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in 2015.  
 
The key question after attacks was how the U.S. would respond to the attacks, 
for which it seemed likely to hold China responsible (although not formally)? 
The Chinese government denied its involvement, and has said that the U.S. is 
just using the China threat to justify expanding cyber capabilities.15 In the end 
of 2015 China said that OPM hack was a criminal act perpetrated by hackers, 
and not a state-sanctioned cyber attack. The certainty of attribution has stayed 
vague, at least in public. Also the messages from the U.S. officials have been 
contradictory. Even if the U.S. government has took a strong stance to blame 
China, the NSA´s director publicly said that “it’s merely an assumption that the 
Chinese government was behind the hack.”16 What about the consequences? 
Even today it is unclear what the real impacts of the attacks were. It has publicly 
told that the hacks of the OPM databases compromised 22.1 million people,17 
but is it unclear what the indirect implications will be in a longer period (how 
the information will be utilized). 
 
Few months before the attacks the U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter an-
nounced18 an updated cyber strategy19, according to which the United States 
would retaliate against major cyber attacks, either with cyber tools or by other 
means. US response has also been discussed with allies, and several different 
options for response have been presented. The OPM cyber attack was the first 
test case of the US cyber strategy, and it seemed to fail. The challenge has been 
the balance between strategy and real actions. There have been also a lot of po-
litical discussions in the U.S. that in which way these attacks should be even 
called. Some have called the OPM hack as an act of war,20 and some have said 
that it is just normal espionage what all countries are doing. 
 
Defense Secretary Ash Carter and National Security Agency Director Michael 
Rogers have announced several times that U.S. policy makers need to decide 
                                                          
15 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People´s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesper-
son Lu Kang's Regular Press Conference on June 15, 2015.” 
16 Tucker, “NSA Chief : Don´t Assume China Hacked OPM”. 
17 Nakashima, ”Hacks of the OPM.” 
18 Stewart, ”Pentagon’s New Cyber Strategy Cites U.S. Ability to Retaliate.” 
19 The DOD Cyber Strategy, 11, 25. 
20 Paletta, ”When Does a Hack Become an Act of War?” 
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how they are going to respond to cyberattacks as countries become more brazen 
in their attempts.  So what have been the options in OPM case for the U.S. to 
response? There have been on the table (in public discussions) at least seven 
policy options,21 that are relevant for retaliating and deterring these kind of 
cyber attacks by foreign nation-states, including their risk of escalation: 1) Pas-
sive deterrence: Doing nothing directly towards China. 2) Diplomatic Protests: 
A largely symbolic response with hardly any risk of escalation. 3) Legal 
Measures: Legal action against Chinese organizations and individuals. 4) Eco-
nomic sanctions: Important in the Chinese case is that the U.S. economy is heav-
ily dependent on interaction with China. 5) Retaliation in cyberspace: By retal-
iating the U.S. would show that future cyber intrusions of this scale will not be 
tolerated. 6) Military retaliation: Such action would probably trigger a military 
response back from China and could culminate in a dangerous process of esca-
lation. 7) Covert retaliation in cyberspace: It is the invisibility, and therefore un-
predictability, of covert retaliation that might deter China – if it was the attacker 
of the OPM in the first place. 
 
The OPM case shows well the variables which are involved when politically 
considering how to respond cyber attacks. The fact that even the United States, 
the leading major cyber power, finds it hard to respond to a major breach of its 
cyber security shows that less powerful states will have even more problems in 
retaliating against cyber attacks. At the same time a study22 found that 92 per-
cent of Americans believe the U.S. government should react in some way to 
cyberattacks if government data is compromised. High-profile cyber attacks by 
nation-states are a relatively new phenomenon, in which there isn’t a roadmap 
of deterrents and responses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Van der Meer and Van der Putten. US Deterrence against Chinese Cyber Espionage. 
22 Vormetric. Media Advisory, 1. 
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5. Political response model 
 
 
U.S. National Security Agency chief Michael Rogers has said that “Because an 
opponent comes at us in the cyber domain doesn’t mean we have to respond in 
the cyber domain.”23 The statement describes well the blurring reality of kinetic 
and non-kinetic response to cyber attacks. There is no reason to believe that a 
cyber attack of any form requires a directly proportionate cyber response. Given 
the reality of asymmetric cyber reliance, the implication that response to a cyber 
attack should not be confined to a cyber response. 
 
Responses can be classified into two categories, kinetic and non-kinetic and 
are dictated by the nature and character of the attack. It is also possible to re-
sponse in both kinetic and non-kinetic means. Even if the line of using kinetic 
and/or non-kinetic ways to response, it is usually argued that kinetic responses 
should remain only allowable if the attack has intended lethal effects, causes 
human suffering or loss of life, or human rights are directly violated.24 This is 
too narrow approach. Digitally dependent societies can be in a big trouble for 
example if attacker confuses the financial records of the state or steals a great 
amount of intellectual property – no one dies but consequences can be very se-
vere to state´s security and competitiveness. However, it becomes difficult to 
justify military response to a cyber attack that does not cause kinetic or physical 
harm as in a conventional or Clausewitzian sense.25 Further, in cyberspace, it 
may be difficult to distinguish an attack from espionage or vandalism, neither 
of which historically is enough to trigger a proportionate response. 
 
Figure 1 represents a one rough example of the framework that policymakers 
should build on. Combining incident impact, policy options, risks, and propor-
tionality, it outlines the different levers of cyberpolitics that can be applied in 
response to escalating levels of cyber incident. The purpose of the framework is 
to illustrate at the same time both the impact and the possible response options 
which should be analyzed much more carefully within the policymakers when a 
state is creating their own cyber re response model. The framework plots the 
                                                          
23 Hackett, “Let´s Get Physical? United States Weighs Options When It Comes to Cyber At-
tack”. 
24 E.g. Wester, “Just Cyberwar”. 
25 Lin, P., Fritzsch L. and Rowe, N, “Is It Possible to Wage a Just Cyberwar?” 
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effects of a cyber incident, with website defacement at one end of the scale and 
loss of life at the opposite end.26 This is described against the level of response, 
ranging from media statements to military responses. Across the response spec-
trum there will be inherent political and legal risks associated with each deci-
sion, and risks increase as the level of the response increases.27 
 
As Tobias Feakin28 argues, policymakers should clearly understand also the 
costs associated with each response. Each response will have an impact on a 
country´s diplomatic relations, reputation, and military and intelligence opera-
tions. Effects need to be understood before a response is chosen as well as the 
four variables which were explained earlier in this paper. It is also questionable 
in cyberspace how far “active defense” or the concept of “hacking back” should 
go. This is a topical question especially in private sector (which is often the main 
target of state-sponsored cyber attacks) where “active defense” has gained 
gained currency as frustration grows about the inability of the government to 
stem lawlessness in cyberspace.29 If private companies are too active and deci-
sive in their hacking back operations, they may mix the state´s response model 
significantly. It should be noted that international law categorically prohibits a 
non-state actor (in this case a corporation) from actively engaging a hostile 
state, even if victimized by a cyber attack.30 Best course of action for a corpora-
tion is to contact their own government to possible respond on their behalf. This 
requires a strong partnership between the government and the private sector. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The framework of the impacts of cyber attacks and proportionate re-
sponses. 
                                                          
26 See Feakin, “How to Respond to a State-Sponsored Cyber Attack”. 
27 Williams, “The Joint Force Commander´s Guide to Cyberspace Operations”. 
28 Feakin. 
29 Timberg, Nakashima, Douglas-Gabriel, “Cyberattacks Trigger Talk of Hacking Back.” 
30 Garrie. “Limited Options for a Corporation Dealing with Cyber Hostilities by State Actors”. 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
 
The role of the cyber domain is increasingly shaping the global security envi-
ronment and the power dynamic between states and other actors. At the same 
time cyber capabilities are reaching towards a more advanced level. We have 
entered an unstable and suspicious era, and we are doing so without a clear 
roadmap of tested political fundamentals. Strategic and political understanding 
is needed when creating a response model and preparing for the cyber attacks. 
Even today, the focus is too often on technical details without the ability to un-
derstand the political context. Ultimately, the decision as to whether a cyber at-
tack is an act of war or something else is a political decision, particularly in cases 
that fall into the grey area between annoyance and actions that attempt to end 
the existence of the state. 
 
Passivity in the occurring cyber attacks only encourages opponents more ag-
gression. While assessing the extent of the damage and identifying attack spon-
sors is especially difficult for cyber incidents, policymakers need to be proactive 
in determining appropriate response options. Developing a framework with 
which to respond to cyberattacks allows policymakers to quickly consider solu-
tions and counter with options previously analyzed for merit and possible con-
sequences. Identifying in advance an appropriate response could prevent the 
state from mistakes that could unintentionally jeopardize political, economic, 
intelligence, and military interest. Policymakers should also clearly understand 
also the costs (such as the risk of escalation) associated with each response.  The 
response will have an impact on a country´s diplomatic relations, reputation, 
and military and intelligence operations. 
 
The increase in state-sponsored cyber attacks is partly the result of a percep-
tion that there’s not a significant “price to pay” for such attacks. The OPM hack 
case indicates that there is significant pressure to respond “in some way”. How-
ever, protocols for responding to state-sponsored national security threats are 
unclear for cyber attacks, which should be understood as a lack of power in cyber 
domain. Given the likely pressure governments will feel to respond to cyberat-
tacks, policymakers need to develop a response framework before a disruptive 
or destructive cyber incident occurs. Although each response will be case spe-
cific (it´s situational dependent), a framework will enable policymakers to 
quickly consider their options. But even if policy response models are created it 
6.  Conclusion 
17 
does not mean that they will be used accurately. In politics – in cyberpolitics – 
there will always be flexibility depending on both current decision makers and 
ambiguity of the situation. The framework is also different in each state, be-
cause each state has its own cultural, political and military characteristics, so 
each state should develop its own policy response framework. What you would 
recommend in one scenario in one country may not be what you would recom-
mend in another. 
 
The need for establishing boundaries in cyberpolitics is critical, without which 
nations leave their borders and critical systems open to cyber attacks from for-
eign actors with impunity. There are plenty of different diplomatic, informa-
tional, military and economic ways to respond and each state must consider 
which suitable ways are for them in each attack. One key issue is to consider 
either physical or cyber response – or both of them together. There is also a 
possibility for covert response: not to make effects public, and no claim is made.  
 
Covert action may be preferred especially in response in cyberspace as a deci-
sion regardless of the strategic and legal consequences. The importance of cre-
ating response levels for state-sponsored cyber attacks is two-fold: it provides a 
framework for deterrence against adversaries and it provides a means to recog-
nize and respond to cyber attacks as they occur. As a benefit, it would also pro-
vide a framework for allied countries to create similar network initiatives pro-
moting greater international cooperation, which is a necessity in cyberspace. 
 
The cyber response framework of the state is also an integral part of state´s 
cyber deterrence. No deterrence theory could succeed without retaliation. In the 
absence of retaliation, there is no incentive for opponents to refrain from attack-
ing. Deterrence is often the threat to use force in retaliation for an attack. 
 
The response framework (when declaring it publicly) is one way to signal 
where the lines are the other side should not cross. There has to be muscular in 
cyberpolitics that would include demonstrations and threaths of retaliatory 
cyber attacks against other states in a bid to create deterrence similar to the Cold 
War-era strategic nuclear deterrence. Such strategic logic underlies the state´s 
declaratory postures, putting adversaries on notice that they should expect even 
a possible kinetic-military response to some cyber attacks. By thinking exter-
nally about the expectations of others, a legal right of armed self-defense might 
contribute to deterrence by establishing and communicating more emphatically 
and clearly red lines associated with self-defensive threats. It helps to signal to 
others thresholds beyond which they should expect a response. 
 
In practice, responses and reactions to cyber attacks will probably involve high 
levels of secrecy. The perpetrators of cyber attacks may try to keep their respon-
sibility and methods secret. Defenders too, may be reluctant to disclose details 
or even the very existence of cyber attacks, whether to protect secrets about their 
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vulnerabilities and defenses, prevent public panic, avoid political embarrass-
ment, or escape unwanted domestic pressure to take retaliatory actions.  
 
Even if the importance of the response model against cyber attacks is empha-
sized in this paper, cyber attacks and cyberpolitics should not be treated in iso-
lation from the other domains. It is unlikely that state-sponsored cyber attacks 
occur only as standalone operations. The ability to integrate cyberpolitics – and 
cyber power – into a broader concept is going to be key. Holistic approach to 
cyberpolitics is needed, and especially the understanding of the increasing con-
verge between cyber and physical worlds. As long as physical and cyber domains 
being treated as separate, there is little hope of securing either one, or increase 
power. The convergence of cyber and physical security has already occurred at 
the technical level and it is vital increase the strategic understanding on the in-
tertwining physical-cyber security environment in order to succeed. 
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